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This report resulted from discussions of a group of officer students of the
Combat System Science and Technology Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School in connection with a course on weapon system proliferation issues held
in the fall quarter of 1993. The student group made several visits to the
Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security Organization at
Lawrence Livcrmore National Laboratory where they learned much about new
sensor technologies which may have significant bearing on aspects of the
tactical ballistic missile problem.
The purpose of this report is to document the ensuing discussions which
the students had with regard to the threat by proliferation of missiles, giving a
fairly comprehensive list of the world's tactical ballistic missile (TBM) systems
and then to discuss some of the options available to find these TBM's before
they can be launched. The focus of this report is primarily on finding the
Transported Erector Launchers (TELs) before they have launched at TBM.
As is evident from the Desert Storm War, the TELs are almost impossible to
find. They can go out into remote areas and blend in with the surroundings
making them virtually invisible. There have been several advances in the
technology of sensor systems which may be able to be used to aid in the
detection of these TELs. Ibis report will address some of the advances in
sensors and how they may be used to detect transported launchers.
II. Proliferation
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with some
basic knowledge of the world's tactical ballistic missile (TBM)
systems. This survey includes missile systems capable of
delivering warheads of at least 250 kg to ranges between 35 and
3000 km. There is no classified material in this section. We did
consult classified sources, but where a piece of classified
information exists, there is an asterisk and a number. The
number refers to the source of that information as listed in the
accompanying bibliography of classified sources.
Appendix A is a list of countries that are known to possess
tactical ballistic missile systems. Ninety-five percent of this
information came from Duncan Lennox's article, "Missile Race
Continues", in the 23 Jan 93 issue of "Jane's Defence Weekly". 1
The other five percent came from equally open sources. For a
more accurate and detailed account, including estimated numbers,
the classified section of the NPS library may have what is
required for certain countries. This report provides some idea
of which systems each country probably has.
Appendix B lists TBM's in service and some of their
characteristics. There are many blank spots in this table. It
is not intended to be a complete work, but a framework upon which
others can build. Some data fields were not available for any
missile system, but are included in the hope that data may become
available. Some TBM systems have the *# code right beside their
name. These are systems that have potentially useful information
far beyond the scope of this work.
In the following section Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and
their cueing mechanisms will be discussed.
Cueing is a very important part of engaging a TBM, both
before and after launch. There are two types of cueing which we
will address. The first is called simply "cueing" and refers to
alerting as to when a TBM launch has occurred or when a TBM
launcher has been detected. The second we will call "preliminary
cueing" and this deals with methods by which we can determine
threat areas and drop UGS into place to provide warning.
There are several aspects to cueing. First, the cueing has
to be relatively accurate, i.e. a small false identification rate
is required. Because of the complexity of military operations,
there has to be a high confidence that the cueing signal is
accurate. Second, the cueing has to be timely. The time of
flight for a TBM varies greatly, thus making it imperative that
the data be relayed to the proper assets in a very timely manner.
The data has to be real time.
III. Counterforce Survei1lance
The Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) initiative for
tactical missile defense (TMD) proposes a counterforce
surveillance concept composed of airborne/space based sensors and
ground based sensors. Airborne and space based sensors include
JSTARS, U-2 intelligence, electronic support measures aircraft,
TENCAP, Boeing 757 Flying Test Bed, and other reconnaissance
platforms. Ground based sensors include unattended ground
sensors (UGS) and special operations forces.
Of particular interest is the methodology to be used to
determine initial UGS deployment to achieve effective
counterforce surveillance. Its deployment obviously relies on
"indicators" of suspected activity in a given area. These
"indicators" come from preliminary cueing.
When considering preliminary cueing for UGS deployment it is
instructive to first look at the ASW analogue to the UGS: the
sonobuoy
.
As with a UGS array, cueing for initial sonobuoy deployment
is critical because of limited assets as well as the limited
detection capabilities of the sensors. Sonobuoys are relatively
expensive and must be deployed by an airborne platform. Their
deployment is usually triggered by some other cueing mechanism,
whether it be SOSUS, TAGOS or some other ASW platform. This
concept is critical. With thousands of square miles of ocean,
sonobuoy deployment cannot be random. It must instead rely on a
triggering mechanism to commence the localization process. There
has to be a starting point from where a search can proceed.
This challenge is the same for initial UGS deployment. A
UGS array obviously cannot extend throughout a theater of
operations; it may only focus on a concentrated area. The
decision as to where to focus on is of the utmost importance.
To address this issue, it is useful to exclude all areas in
a theater of operations which cannot support TBM operations.
This "negative search" methodology rules out those areas in which
TBM operations would be impossible or highly unlikely. 2 Examples
of such areas would be mountainous terrain or isolation from
existing internal infrastructure such as roads. From the
negative search model, tailored assumptions can be incorporated
to accommodate the particular situation. Of course, such
intelligence gathered prior to commencement of hostilities would
be of great utility.
The exclusion of unlikely TBM operating areas, however, will
still leave an expanse of territory where they can most
definitely operate. A cueing mechanism in the operating area is
now required to indicate suspected areas of activity: it will
provide at least a starting point from where to begin the search.
The mechanism may be as simple as a prior TBM launch in the area.
This "flaming datum" strategy provided no success in the Gulf
War. UGS assets, could, however, monitor future activity in the
area.
Ideally it is desired to avoid the flaming datum strategy
entirely and instead to focus on detecting TBM pre-launch
activities. This includes TBM units, launch sites previously
surveyed, logistics facilities and other fixed facilities where
appropriate
.
A. Preliminary Cueing Mechanisms




- Space Based (Overhead) Sensors
In this context, tactical intelligence refers to analyzing
current enemy activity, gathering data from prisoners of war and
other sources of HUMINT, and analyzing prior TBM launch patterns
and activity. It includes a significant degree of speculation.
Sensors, on the other hand, provide definite indicators of
activity. A sensor may tell as little as a detection which is
considered "anomalous" to the contiguous environment or it may
tell as much as target identification and position, or most
likely tell something in between.
The sensors which can be used for UGS preliminary cueing may
be divided between "overhead" and "airborne" sensors. It may be
useful to consider overhead sensors as national assets, while
airborne sensors may be considered as theater based assets.
Of the numerous sensors which could provide cueing for UGS
deployment, two cogent examples will be discussed: an overhead
sensor (LANDSAT) and an airborne sensor (wavelength tunable video
system) .
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B. Overhead Sensor System Concept
The Defense Support Program (DSP) is a classified overhead
system which was designed to detect in the infrared region (i.e.
missile launch)
.
For the purposes of cueing for UGS deployment,
a space based system would require optical scanners for imaging
purposes
.
A representative system could be expected to be constructed
in two tiers. The first tier would involve a low resolution
system and a broad search area. The first level of data
acquisition would narrow the intelligence to potential target
areas. The second tier, with high resolution, would allow
concentrated search areas with a subsequent increase in data
processing requirements
.
Although there are DOD specific overhead systems, LANDSAT
provides a useful unclassified illustration of the utility of
satellite reconnaissance for this application. DOD assets may
expect to have significantly enhanced capabilities.
The primary contribution of an overhead asset would be
timely identification and tracking of events; specifically,
mobile missile launchers over wide areas. Acquired data could
also be used to develop a continuous record of vehicle movement
for off-line analysis and accurate designation of TBM units,
logistic bases, and fixed facilities for targeting purposes.
Overhead sensors in this context are analogous to the regional
localization of submarines using the SOSUS system.
The most recently deployed LANDSAT units operate at lower
altitudes than their predecessors (approximately 700 km) . They
provide higher resolution, ease of shuttle recovery for
modification and repairs, and improved repeat cycles
(approximately 15 orbits per day over 16 days) . The Global
positioning System (GPS) enables a more accurate localization.
Each satellite consists of two primary sensors; a multispectral
scanner (MSS) and a thematic mapper (TM) . These are sensors
which operate primarily in the visible and infrared detection
regions
.
The MSS is a mechanical scanner with 82 m resolution on the
earth's surface. The MSS conducts data acquisition via surface
scan in strips (six line simultaneously) normal to the orbital
path of the unit. Overlaps forward are 5.4% and 7.3% on the
sides of the orbital track and the data rate is 15 Mbps. The TM
is a mechanical scanner as well but provides a more refined 30 m
ground resolution and dynamic range. These improvements are due
to improved spectral, spacial, and radiometric characteristics.
The TM scans (16 lines simultaneously) seven spectral bands which
include blue, green, red, near IR, mid IR, and thermal. The data
rate is about 85 Mbps. These general data are given to provide
an unclassified estimation of asset capability.
In addition to the MSS and TM, other remote sensing
technologies may be employed to enhance intelligence gathering
capabilities. Examples include high resolution infrared
spectrometers, IR Echelle grating spectrometers, and broad band
LID/AR. These systems are currently being researched at the
8
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for possible use in
implementation of weapons proliferation treaty enforcement. Some
of these technologies could further enable an overhead system to
detect and localize pollutants and vehicle emissions.
Acquired data may be directly transmitted to earth-based
antenna receiving stations or via geosynchronous tracking and
data relay satellites (TORS) . The TORS satellites are high
capacity communications satellites currently employed and leased
to NASA. The dissemination of data is dependent upon the rate
data fusion, analysis, processing, and other C3 system
architecture characteristics
.
The method of data dissemination would include a network for
cueing other reconnaissance assets; specifically, airborne search
sensors
.
The advantages of a space based cueing system includes near
global coverage of the earth's surface on a predictable basis.
Digital imaging and computer processing increase the level of
extractable intelligence. The system could be limited by
atmospheric anomalies, darkness, and saturation problems in some
of the bands depending on topography. However, the clear
advantage to overhead space based systems is the ability to
gather data covertly.
In the 1980' s Iraq/Iran war, DSP monitored 100 exchanges of
SS-1 Scud missiles between Iraq and Iran. In the 1991 Gulf War,
the best two second generation DSP's were moved over the war
region. The DSP's indentified general target are after only two
minutes into a seven minute Scud missile flight. The DSP was
able to localize the target area within six kilometers. The DSP
was also able to provide a real time data link to the Patriot
missile system for counterdefense . Both of the examples above
show just how valuable DSP can really be for preliminary cueing.
C. Airborne Sensor System Concept
The wavelength tunable video system is one example of the
airborne sensor concept. This system was developed by the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 3 As its name implies,
this system can be used over a continuum of wavelengths for data
acquisition. The system uses a tunable filter which provides a
multispectral imaging capability, with high resolution and medium
range resolution. The filters are electronically tunable at
video rates.
Reflected light from objects passes through a camera lens, a
tunable filter, an image intensifier, and into a charged couple
detector (CCD) camera. The image is broken down by pixels,
processed, and sent to either a monitor or optical storage.
The system may be employed to scan an area to search for
known spectral signatures, known spectral shifts, or unexpected
spectral features or shifts.
If the wavelength (s) corresponding to a specific activity is
known, the system is tuned to scan on that one wavelength. A
vehicle, for example, may radiate on a specific wavelength.
Effluents and pollution may be detected in bodies of water. A
heat source radiates wavelengths in the IR spectrum. Camouflage
10
will radiate at different wavelengths than that of the
surrounding flora it is attempting to blend into. Images that
are indiscernible to the human eye can be found through the
system by breaking down the radiating electromagnetic spectrum
into discrete wavelengths.
If specific activity is unknown, which is often the case,
the system may be utilized to compare the same area after a
duration of time. Images may then be processed to show any
differences between two snapshots in time. The differences
between the snapshots may provide indicators of certain types of
activity. For example, stressed foliage which may appear
unchanged in the continuous visible spectrum may exhibit distinct
changes under specific wavelengths over time.
Video processing of data may also be used to produce
subtraction processed images, which compare the raw images of
wavelengths of close proximity. For example, a tank hidden in
brush becomes visible when the subtraction processed image is
produced between the differences of raw images.
In regards to UGS cueing, the wavelength tunable video
system could be used for several applications:
- Detection of stressed foliage
- Remote tracking of vehicle (or other signature specific
platform)
•
- Movement or disturbance of earth
- Detection of vehicular or foot traffic
- Detection of disturbances in remote areas
11
- Detection of atmospheric vents for underground covert
facilities.
As demonstrated, a major advantage of this system is that an
acquisition profile can be tailored for specific detection
scenarios
.
This system is lightweight and affordable (consisting of
primarily off the shelf hardware) . While the existing prototype
is ground based, the second generation model currently under
design will be adaptable to an airborne platform. However, the
aircraft must fly at relatively low altitude in order scan a
given area. This may not be feasible due to the location of or
enemy activity within the desired scan area.
An attractive alternative is to adapt the wavelength tunable
video system for use on a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV)
.
Mounting on an RPV would permit investigation of areas in enemy
territory deemed too dangerous for low altitude aircraft
reconnaissance. An RPV could fly lower and slower than an
aircraft, permitting a more detailed examination of the scan
area. The on station time would be significantly greater than
that of an aircraft. Both risk and expense would be minimal.
While data could be extracted upon RPV recovery, real time video
could be obtained by use of a data link.
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IV. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)
Now that we have seen what sensor suites are available for
the cueing of deployment of unattended ground sensors, we will
turn our focus to the ground sensors themselves.
A. UGS Pros and Cons
We will first examine the pros and cons of using ground
based sensors as a means of detection. Having heard various
opinions on the utility and merit of Unattended Ground Sensors
(UGS) with regards to counterforce and counterfire operations
against Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Launchers, there is an
apparent negative bias against UGS based on the perception with
regard to the success of such systems in the past. Thus, we
shall briefly define the arguments against UGS, and counter these
arguments in an attempt to overcome this negative bias. As The
Electronic Battlefield was used as a major resource, we shall
first define "Electronic Battlefield", then examine the issues
related to cost, discrimination and deployment. 4
Author Paul Dickson presents two definitions which he terms
"Electronic Battlefield I", or EB I, and "Electronic Battlefield
II" (EB II) . EB I refers to the first generation UGS, those of
limited discrimination capability which would carry one or more
of the following: seismic, acoustic, Infrared (IR) , and magnetic
sensors. Note that although Infrared (IR) sensors are included
in this list, only limited success was achieved early in UGS
development. EB II refers to second generation UGS systems, ones
with enhanced discrimination capability and/or artificial
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intelligence, as well as a large list of new weapons enhancements
not related to UGS, such as the Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) , cruise missiles, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
Sensors, laser weapons, and the Integrated Battlefield Control
System (IBCS) . Many of these weapons developments are already
deployed, while some are in various stages of development . For
the purposes of our discussion, when the term UGS is used, we
mean the EB II version, complete with neural network, multiple
integrated sensors, decision aids to assist the user in
deployment, and means for real time infusion to assist on scene
assets in counterforce and counterfire operations.
Let us first examine, then, the issues relating to the cost
of an UGS system which can properly carry out the TBM
counterforce mission. The first argument is that an UGS system
would be too costly based strictly on the pricetag for each
sensor, and the fact that these are disposable assets used over
wide areas requiring large numbers of sensors. While true that
present costs are quite high, mass production should rapidly
reduce cost, especially in the wartime scenario. For example,
during the Vietnam War, the cost of an Acoustic Directional
Seismic Intrusion Detector (ADSID) was reduced from $100 in 1967
to $15 in 1970 when measured by cost -per-sensor-per-day. Also,
one must compare the cost of each sensor to the cost of other
proposed means of detecting Transporter Erector-Launchers (TELs)
,
such as airborne assets with their large fuel and maintenance
costs. Arguments also arise over the cost of command and control
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of such a system and/or the cost of integrating this type of
system into pre-existing systems. While this cost may be large,
existing data links and those proposed to counter the TBM threat
should make major expenditures unnecessary. Thus, while cost is
a major issue, when compared to other alternatives, the
comparative advantage of UGS seems rather clear.
Next we shall examine the issues related to UGS
discrimination capabilities. Note that Vietnam era EB I systems
had little or no capability to discriminate between say a truck
or a jeep. The argument against UGS would then be that we might
indiscriminately destroy friendly units or personnel without
thought, or, if we do build in a discrimination capability, the
cost would be too high, the system would not have rapid enough
response time, and one might still improperly classify the sensed
disturbance, whether it be human error or system error. This
argument is countered by the fact that the ability of present EB
II sensors with "feature vectors" processed by neural networks
can rapidly identify the intended object. Even in Igloo White
operations over twenty years ago, the normal time between target
acquisition and weapons delivery was less than five minutes.
Note also that the TEL has a rather large seismic, magnetic and
acoustic signature which would make them ideal targets for such a
system. This discrimination problem is really no different than
that experienced by sonar operators using narrowband and
broadband noise to classify contacts.
It has also been argued that deception and decoy attempts
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might prove successful against such neural networks. There is
presently no good evidence to support such a claim, but one could
surmise that the use of multiple sensors in each unit would make
it very difficult to produce misclassification, as data from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) would suggest. The
improved capabilities of the sensors themselves with respect to
sensitivity would further hinder efforts to decoy or to produce
improper classification. Even if such decoy and deception
techniques were successful, battlefield adaptation as well as
system adaptation should make it possible to find traits unique
to the decoy or deception technique to later render them useless.
We shall end our analysis with the most frequently used
argument against UGS, that the successful deployment of hundreds
of UGS would not yield sufficient area coverage to produce
significant enhancement of mobile launcher detection probability.
While it is true that motorized vehicle detection ranges are on
the order of a couple hundred yards, negative search techniques
and other intelligence sources should allow for optimal
deployment of UGS. The lesson of the Vietnam war was that UGS
capabilities were only successful when used in non- linear
applications. Thus, while a barrier approach, such as the
McNamara Line, was vastly unsuccessful, shorter duration
operations using cuing from other sources proved highly
successful, such as the alertment of the attack on Khe Sahn. The
non- linear nature of TEL counterforce and counterfire operations
make UGS the perfect device for such a mission.
16
Finally, the argument is made that UGS cannot be deployed
successfully over long periods of time due to insufficient
battery life, driving up the cost of the system and limiting
system flexibility. While this was true of EB I sensors, the
present day systems can be configured to conserve battery power
by "waking up" only on certain detection features or when told to
by the system. This major improvement in UGS capability allows
the system to rapidly be configured to optimize detection
capabilities. Thus, while arguments that UGS cannot be
successfully employed have some merit, improvements in many areas
make them more attractive for use in the TEL counterforce and
counterfire missions.
One can easily argue that the bias against UGS is not based
on present technological capabilities, but on the limited success
of these systems in the past, most of which come under the
classification of EB I systems. Therefore, the use of UGS in the
TBM counterforce/counterfire mission should not be ruled out
prematurely. Furthermore, based on the unsuccessful execution of
this mission in the Gulf War using airborne and satellite assets
exclusively, one can argue the need for an alternative system
which has the potential to perform this mission at a lower cost
with better results. As Dickson points out, "a sensor is a
soldier able to do the most exacting reconnaissance work; it does
not sleep, know fear, bleed, eat, or disobey."
B. Modular Intelligent Sensor System (MISS)
Unattended ground sensors have to be very flexible. They
17
have to be able to allow their monitoring requirements
established at the very last minute. They have to meet
challenging physical environments. They must be very tamper
proof. The UGS which we are going to review appear to meet all
of these requirements.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed
an UGS called the Modular Intelligent Sensor System (MISS)
.
5 It
has been developed around the following idea:
"Many sensors, like many senses, enhance recognition
capability"
.








Appendix C shows the basic components of MISS and also how a
typical MISS would be connected.
MISS is an architecture for implementing modular intelligent
sensors. It includes a basic bus structure, an address
resolution protocol, and a communication protocol. Appendix D is
a simple block diagram of MISS.
MISS can be developed to have a sensor suite that can be
trained to classify specific activities. This is an incredible
18
asset to military operations. Depending on the target which is
being looked at, the system can be set up with the appropriate
sensors to look only for that specific target's recognition
features
.
This unattended ground sensor works by using feature
vectors. The feature vectors use an assortment of data obtained
from each sensor in the suite. By using these feature vectors, a
large amount of data can be sent in a very compact form.
Appendix E shows examples of what various seismic signals would
look like for aircraft activities or targets and their events.
As can be seen, the sensor can distinguish between each
individual event. Also in Appendix E, is an example of how the
use of a geophone and a fluxgate magnetometer would be used to
produce a feature vector to be analyzed.
This system can send real time data to a remote hand held
monitor or to a satellite. The system can be designed to look
for only certain targets and when that target is encountered,
send off the signal to alert of a threat. The system uses a
neural network to analyze all of the parameters of the target
.
The neural network allows quick analysis of the information and
easy corrections to target characteristics. The real value of
these sensors is that they require less data transfer, size,
volume, power, and operator training.
C. Air-delivered Targeting And Surveillance System
(ATASS)
The unattended ground sensor of most interest to military
19
operations is the Air-delivered Targeting And Surveillance System
(ATASS) . 6 This system is being developed to provide the
following:
- covert delivery and operation for long times
- seismic and magnetic baseline sensor package to provide
robust, non-LOS detection and classification
- on-board neural processing to allow data fusion among
multiple sensors or multiple units
- a modular architecture to permit addition of alternative
sensors and changes to device thresholds or target
detection algorithms
- remote, in- field reprogramming of mission parameters
- military and specialized communications capability,
including GS and LEO satellite transmit/receive
- g-hardened, tested hardware to maximize reliability
- use of off-the-shelf componentry to minimize cost.
ATASS will use all of the basic components of MISS. It will be
air dropped into hostile areas to monitor for specific targets.
There has been an ATASS study done at LLNL to determine the
feasibility and relative success of ATASS. The assumptions that
have been made for the study are:
- point of insertion accuracy of 20 meters
- insertion within 10° of vertical
- ATASS package weight < 10 kg
- impact velocity between 50 and 150 m/s
- standoff range of at least 70 km
20
- minimum cost components
- compatible with existing delivery systems.
Appendix F shows the optimized air vehicle configuration and
calculated data of the ATASS glide performance, optimized flight
regime, and high-g tests.
The ATASS system could be used in numerous ways. The first
is basic search method used with sonar buoys. If there is a
target in a known area, it would be bracketed and localized using
ATASS. ATASS could be used in conjunction with airborne sensors,
tactical intelligence or space based sensors as discussed
earlier. ATASS can also be used to search along well known
travelled roadways. Appendix G shows an example of this concept.
Appendix H shows an example concept of operations for CAP
cued by ground sensors. In this scenario, the ground sensors are
used to alert aircraft to redirect their search to a different
area and then the aircraft must acquire with SAR before an
engagement takes place to avoid false detections.
21
V. Conclusion
Unattended ground sensors, whether the MISS or ATASS, can
have a very big impact on mission performance. Appendix I shows
the probability of an aircraft acquiring a TBM when using UGS
with SAR. As can be seen, using UGS greatly increases the
probability of detecting a TBM and its launcher.
LLNL has developed and fielded a number of unattended ground
sensors for detection and classification of vehicles, aircraft,
personnel and other human events. The current generation of
sensors use an enabling architecture known as the Modular
Intelligent Sensor System (MISS) . A full -range of sensor options
are available and easily interchangeable without significant
changes to the bus or the system software. The deployed MISS
units make use of a mult i- sensor, feature vector approach to
classification which allows use of the large amount of available
training data to implement a fast, accurate neural network.
In development is a hardened UGS known as the Air-delivered
Targeting and Surveillance System (ATASS) for missions specific
to counterproliteration such as detection and targeting of mobile
TBMs. Several studies are being conducted to determine the
required performance and evaluate the utility of UGS in scenarios
relevant to counterproliteration activities.
22
VI . Suggestion for Further Study-
Both the airborne and overhead concepts previously mentioned
have far reaching applications for initial cueing for UGS
deployment. Both sensors have the ability to scan over a range
of wavelengths. However, how should they be used and how should
the data they produce be interpreted?
What is currently needed is development of system-specific
indicators that may correspond to TBM related activities. What
wavelengths or video processing techniques are required? How do
pre-launch activities translate into indicators that are
discernible to an overhead system or a wavelength tunable video
system? The technology discussed is available and ready for
exploitation; the challenge is determining what to look for.
Modeling is required to determine wavelengths and bandwidths of
concern. Once completed, satellite resolution requirements for
optical imaging need to be determined.
There are still many things to be accomplished with the
unattended ground sensors themselves. Detection ranges for each
of the components needs to be resolved. Transmission methods and
transmission times need to be established. Test and evaluation
of these sensors need to be performed.
These cueing mechanisms need to be incorporated into a
concept of operations for unattended ground sensors. Data
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Date: 05/12/93 APPENDIX A
Country Systems
1 Afghanistan SCUD-B
2 Algeria SCUD-B, FROG-7
3 Argentina Alacran, Condor 2
4 Azerbaijan SCUD-B
5 Belarus SS-21, SCUD-B
6 Belgium LANCE
7 Brazil MB/EE- 150,-350,-600, -1000, SS-300, SS-1000
8 Bulgaria SCUD-B
9 Czech Rep SS-21, SCUD-B
10 Egypt SCUD-B,VECTOR,SAKR 80,SCUD-B IMP.CONDOR 2
11 France PLUTON, HADES
12 Georgia SCUD-B
13 Germany LANCE
14 Hungary SS-21, SCUD-B
15 Iran IRAN-130,SCUD-B, SCUD-B IMP.M-18, EAGLE
16 Iraq AL HUSAYN,ALL ABBAS,SCUD-B, SCUD-B IMP,SS-12,SS-21
17 Israel JERICHO I & E, LANCE
18 Italy LANCE
19 Kazakhstan SS-21, SCUD-B
20 Kuwait FROG-7
21 Libya SS-21, SCUD-B, AL FATAH, LAYTH, FROG-7, MB/EE'S
22 Netherlands LANCE
23 PRC M-7, M-9, M-l 1, CSS-2,CSS-l,CSS-5,DF-25
24 PRK NO DONG I,SCUD-B,SCUD-B IMP
25 Pakistan HAIFT LIL & 3
26 Poland SS-21, SCUD-B
27 Romania SCUD-B
28 Russia SS-21,SCUDS A-D,FROG-7,SS-4,SS-12,SS-23
29 S. Africa ARNISTON
30 S. Korea KORSSM(NHK-l)
31 Saudi Arabia CSS-2
32 Slovakia SS-21,SCUD-B
33 Syria SS-21, SCUD-B, SCUD-B IMP
34 UK LANCE
35 USA LANCE, ATACMS
36 Ukrain SS-21,SCUD-B
37 Vietnam SCUD-B
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